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THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.
"One thing I take to be clear, and it is this that pub-
licfpolicy is a variable quantity; that it must vary and
does vary with the habits, capacities and ofpbortunities
of the public."1
I.
Legal obligations and rights are the expressions of our
ideas of public policy. One who regards the law, in so far as
it is just, as springing from inborn and necessary conceptions
of right and wrong has but to turn to legal history. Let him
select what is to him the simplest example of a law following
natural justice and trace the history of that law. He will
generally find his own ancestors denying the obligation which
he considers binding as a matter of necessary intuition. Take,
for instance, the rule of our law, that he who has, with the
skill of his hands, fashioned a useful article, owning the arti-
cle, has a right to the proceeds of its sale. To us there is
nothing which seems to spring more from the inborn neces-
sities of things. We brush aside the fact that slavery has
existed in almost every society which the world has known,
on the ground that the institution is a wrong and contrary to
nature. We quote with approval the words of Blackstone:
"It is repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law,
I Remarks of Mr. Justice Kekewich in Davis v. Davis, 36 Ch. D. 359.
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that such a state should exist anywhere." I But all who are
familiar with our legal history, know that this rule of law,
depends on the recognition of individual existence. In prim-
ative society the individual only exists as an indistinguishable
part of a large unit-his family or his tribe. The wrong of
one member of a family can be wiped out by the death of
another member, or a payment of the wergeld by the family
of the wrongdoer to the fafnily of the injured party. The
Gods, angry at the sins of the evil members of a tribe, are
propitiated by the sacrifice of any member of that tribe
That the fruits of the labor of the individual should belong
to the larger unit of which he formed a part is as natural to
one stage of civilization as the opposite rule is to us. And
both rules meet the requirements of a sound public policy.
In early stages of social development isolation meant exter-
mination, or, at least, precluded any advancement. Only
those primitive peoples who can hold together overcome the
adverse conditions resulting from primitive environment.
Had the same strong feeling of individuality existed in a
primitive society as in our own, the disintegrating forces would
have been so strong that it would have been impossible to have
had a continuous social life, and man could not have lifted
himself out of barbarism. The rule of primitive law is suited to
primitive conditions. On the other hand, once society has
gotten over the embryo stage, there is much less danger of
disintegration. When a strong sense of social unity has
created a government able to protect the individual in his
rights, and hold him as an individual responsible for his acts,
then it would seem that the highest attainments of the civili-
zation were only compatible with a wide freedom of indi-
vidual action.
To take another illustration. The two fundamental rules of
our law, the right of private property and the freedom of
private contract, are usually accepted by us without question
B. I., p. 423.
2 In India, where new and old ideas are blended, in the dancing girl
cast, the gains of science are divisible, that is, belong to the family of the
worker as a whole, when gained while receiving a family maintenance :
Alasani v. Ralnachalam, Madras H. C. Repts. 56.
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as right, because they correspond to the conditions of our life.
Yet neither existed in feudal times. Dual ownership of
property, and status were the fundamental conceptions on
which feudal society rested. The villain did not own the land
he tilled or the cattle with which he tilled it. Both belonged,
in one sense, to the lord, yet the lord had to give him the land
and the cattle. The villain could not leave the land, and
contract with another lord. Nor did he want to. His
desire was to obtain a fixed status in the community; not to
be free, but to owe certain services to some one. To be free,
-that is, without a lord who would be responsible for him,
was to be flyma, a fugitive, and the words of Athelstan must
have had an ugly sound; "let whoever can come at him slay
him as a thief." I
The desirability of the sole ownership of property, the free-
dom to contract at will, wear different aspects in different
stages of social progress. Our ideas of the desirable are the
result of our conditions. There is no legal conception, how-
ever apparently fundamental, which time with its changes may
not alter.
The thought here expressed receives almost universally a
partial recognition. Most men of education can point out the
main lines of development of the more fundamental of our legal
conceptions. But it is curious to observe that so few recognize
the possibility of any further change in the conditions of life
which may affect a further radical change in our ideas. Rousseau
and his followers regarded the complete freedom of the indi-
vidual from governmental restraint as the final goal of civiliza-
tion. Spencer, in spite of his half discovery of the principle
of evolution, regards, the formula, that every man should have
all the liberty that does not interfere with the equal liberty of
any other man, as being continuingly necessary to all future
progress. It is not that these men, and they are typical of a
large class, do not look for further progress. They are apos-
ties of progress. But that progress is always to be conditioned
on the recognition of some idea concerning society, govern-
nient or the individual. If we look at this idea, we will gene-
1 Atheist, II., Sec. 2, cited in Andrews Old Saxon Manor, 12, 178.
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rally find that their belief in it is due to the fact that it satisfies
the best views of present public policy based on existing con-
ditions. Take the example of the two men we have mentioned.
The government which governed least was the best govern-
ment for the eighteenth century. Liberty of opportunity, econo-
mic as well as political, has been the highest duty of society
in the nineteenth century. Will it not be strange if changing
conditions will not push some other idea forward as funda-
mental to the mind of the men of the twentieth century? The
explanation of the mental attitude of which we speak lies in
the fact that before they have projected their fundamental idea
forward as the sine qua non of human progress, they have read
it back into history, making history one long proof of how
much better society as a whole would have been at every
stage of its development, had it realized the beauty of the
fundamental principle. Rousseau shows the advantage of
freedom at all stages of progress, and Spencer points to the
survival of the fittest among all animal life wherever the fullest
liberty, compatible with equality, is allowed. Had these men
not been engrossed in explaining their respective theories, they
would have seen that many stages of past development were
made possible by the practical application of principles the
reverse of their own. Thus, the rise of the chief in the village
community made it possible for the Western world to move out
of primitive communism, and take its first great step in pro-
gressive civilization. Yet the rise of the chief destroyed equality,
and curtailed the liberty of the great mass of the community.
The result was great opportunity to the few, and the condition
fitted the needs of the time. The Greek never passed the
stage which makes economic inequality essential to progress.
Plato, therefore, as our own publicists, reading history and all
future in the light of the conditions which confronted him,
made the slavery of the many the basis of his " Republic."
What is true of the theories of Spencer is true of Rous-
seau. Great upward movements of our race have been the
result of a practical application of ideas, the exact opposite of
that advocated by his school. Thus, in the Middle Ages, we
find the evils of feudalism dying before a strong central gov-
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•ernment. The great architectural triumphs of that age and
the beauty of the work of the artisans generally, bespeak the
fact that the guild, with its direct interference with trade, pro-
duced laborers who must have gotten something out of life
which ours do not get, to give so much to their art. However ill-
suited the old mercantile system was to the last century, some-
how a few centuries back, a country which maintained the bal-
ance of trade in its favor, was the successful country.' The
result of all which is, that what is good for us may not have
'been good for our ancestors, or be of advantage to our de-
scendants. A general recognition of this idea will have sev-
-eral beneficial results. It will improve our historical sense,
.and stop shallow criticism of our ancestors for not following
what we think is the only right way. Again, it will enable
those who discuss the value of any idea concerning law or
government of men to select the phenomena which can throw
light upon it.
II.
If all our rules of law, no matter how fundamental are sub-
ject to change, with changing conditions, it may not be a
wholly profitless task to inquire whether there are any changes
going on around us which forbode a change in some of our
7fundamental legal conceptions. There are many things which
are new in the nineteenth century. Industrial organization
has undergone a profound change. With the general nature
of the industrial change of our time all are familiar. It is the
consolidation of the direction of industry in a few hands. Where
there were at the beginning of the century small establishments,
there are now large works; involving the concentration of an
enormous amount of labor and capital. These changes have
not gone on equally in all branches of production. In agri-
-culture there has been comparatively little development in the
direction indicated. In transportation, the manufacture of
sugar, the production of oil, anything, in short, where the capital
-necessary to produce any commodity at all is large, the con-
solidation of the direction of the industry in the hands of a
'This assertion is still a subject of dispute. See contra, Cunningham's
"Growth of English Industry and Commerce."
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few is complete. Other industries, where large capital to pro-
duce some result is not necessary do not seem to escape the
tendency of the time. The small retailer gives place to the
large department store; within the last few years the entire
boot and shoe production has passed out of the hands of those
who make boots and shoes to order and into the hands of the
ready made shoe manufacturer. We might go on multiplying
familiar instances ad infinitum, but the main fact remains-the-
real control of industry in many of its branches is in the hands,
of a few individuals or corporations.
Because law is the outcome of our environment, and because
there are new conditions, it does not necessarily follow that
any very radical change is going to take place in our law.
The change from stage coaches to railroads made a vast differ-
ence in our means of transportation, but it did not introduce
any new principles into the law relating to the carrier's liabil-
ity for the safety of the goods committed to his care. But on
the other hand, as I have tried to show, all law does depend
on the proper public policy for the conditions which exist, anct
the changes in the conditions of life which have been going on
for the past eighty years are great enough to produce the
most profound changes in our law.
Industry may be said to consist in the production and ex-
change of commodities. Production requires land, labor and
capital. The entrepreneur is the man who organizes the forces.
of production, and who owns and sells the completed product.
The industrial changes of which we have been speaking are
changes which affect primarily the entrepreneur. At the be-
ginning of the century the laborer worked for wages and he
still works for wages. The position of capital is substantially
the same. The entrepreneur alone has changed. Relatively
he has become a less numerous class. As an individual and
on the average he employs more men and he sells more pro-
duct. If there is to be any change in our law as a result of'
our new industrial life, it is to be in the relation of the entre-
preneur with those with whom as entrepreneur he comes in
contact; that is the laborer and the purchaser of his goods.
We need not *expect to find any change in the relation of
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-one laborer to another, or of one purchaser to another pur-
* chaser.
In our present law the relation of the entrepreneur to his
men on the one hand, and the purchaser of the completed
product on the other, is a purely contractual relation. It is
an exchange of goods for money, or services for money, on
the basis of a contract determined between the parties. The
entrepreneur has a right to contract with whom he pleases for
the work that he wants done, and, owning the completed
product, he can sell it for the best price that he can get. The
common law recognizes no obligation on the part of the work-
men to labor, or the entrepreneur to employ him or pay him
any certain wages. There is no obligation on the entrepreneur
to part with his goods at a reasonable price.
The question which I desire to examine is this-Have the
industrial changes of which I have been speaking affected, or
are they likely to affect, the legal relation between the entre-
_preneur and the purchaser of goods on the one hand, or the
laborer on the other; and first to turn to the entrepreneur as a
seller of the completed commodity.
III.
The common law has always regarded trade as of sufficient
public importance to set aside the right of those who are
engaged in it to do exactly as they please. The restrictions
of the common law have not been directed to contracts
between the seller and the buyer, but to contracts between
sellers or producers among themselves to limit competition.
Ever since the reign of Henry V.,' and probably from the
time that trade was important to the State, an agreement
between two persons to restrain one of them from exercis-
ing a particular trade or calling has been prima fade illegal.
2
The ground of this interference with the right of free contract
has been, as a rule, the familiar maxim that " competition is
the life of trade." 3
12 H. V., pl. 22.2 Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 ; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal
- Co., 68 Pa. 173.
3 Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 349.
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Thus Judge Mcllvaine, in Salt Lake City v. Gutherie,' says:-
"Public policy unquestionably favors competition in trade to.
the end that its commodities may be offered to the consumer
as cheaply as possible, and is opposed to monopolies, which
tend to advance market prices, to the injury of the general
public." 2 Mr. Arthur T. Hadley has an interesting article in
the Yale Review,' in which he points out that while "the
Roman Law allowed free determination of prices as a conse-
quence of the unrestricted right of private property, the Com-
mon Law encouraged it as a means of supplying a market
more fully and fairly than could be done in any other way.
The common law both in its rule and exceptions recognize
the public commercial end, which the Roman Law did not."
The Roman Law left trade unrestricted because trade was of
comparatively slight importance to the Roman people. A large
portion of the industrial activity of Rome was the work of
those whose products were consumed by their own masters..
Trade was not as it is with us the life of the state.
Not only have the Courts refused to enforce contracts.
between two or more producers regulating their output, or
controlling prices, but both the United States and the several
states have passed laws making such contracts between pro--
ducers indictable offences. None of our Courts have intimated
that these acts are unconstitutional as depriving the producer
of his natural rights.4 The spirit which passes these acts, and
the spirit which accepts them as unquestionably unconstitu--
tional, is the same spirit which led Judge Hull in the case
from the Year Books, where the plaintiff sought to enforce an
agreement of the defendant not to exercise his trade as a dyer
for half a year, to exclaim : "per dieu si le plaintiff fut ici, it
irra al prison, tang il utfait fine at roy," and which led Chief-
1 35 Ohio, 666.
2Judges, however, have doubted the validity of this maxim; see Per-
kins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 521, and cases cited by Mr. G. S. Patterson in
his work on "The Law of Contracts in Restraint of Trade."
3Vol. I., p. 56 (May, 1892). See for a discussion of this article one by
the present author on Can Prices be Regulated by Law," 32 Am. LAw
REG. & REv. 9.
4 United States v. E. C. Knight Sugar Refining Co., 156 U. S. I;;
People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun. (N. Y.) 354.
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Justice Parker, in Mitchell v. Reynolds,' to declare that, "to
obtain the sole exercise of any trade throughout England was
a monopoly and a crime." Thus, the State has always
regarded one who trades as engaged in an occupation in
which his freedom of contract is limited, whenever the exer-
cise of that freedom interfered with the established views of
what was public policy for the trade as a whole. It being
considered that combinations among producers tending to
control a market, are prejudicial to the interests of the people,
any act having this effect is more or less a crime. In this
instance the welfare of the State overrides the sacredness of
the right of private contract.
It must be borne in mind that contracts in restraint of trade
are declared illegal, not because an agreement between pro-
ducers has any inherent viciousness, but bedause it tends, by
stifling competitions between producers, to create a monopoly,
placing the community which purchases the product at the
mercy of the seller. Where the agreement has not this result
it is upheld by the court
Thus, the answer of the early common law, and of our"
modern law, as far as we have followed the early spirit, to the
tendency toward centralization in modern industry, is that
when that centralization takes the form of an agreement.
between individual producers to submit to a joint control over
their several businesses,, the law will meet the economic ten-
dency by declaring it illegal.
Prior to the last few years, agreements in restraint of trade
of the kind discussed in the cases was the only way in which
a monopoly could be created in an industry. But the increased
familiarity of the business world with the joint stock com-
pany, or business corporation, has now rendered it possible for
a monopoly to be secured, not by the agreement of distinct
producers, but by the creation of a corporate entity as the sole-
producer. Take, for instance, the American Sugar Refining
Company. This corporation produces practically all the -
lI P. Williams.
2 Wickers v. vans, 3 T. & J. 38; Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6.
N. Y. 473.
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sugar in the United States, yet, in the old sense of the word,
it is not an agreement in restraint of trade. The different pro-
ducers of sugar sold out to the corporation. They did not
agree not to re-enter the sugar refining business, yet business
conditions make such a re-entry out of the question.
The result, which has caused the courts from the earliest
times to declare contracts in restraint of trade illegal, exists.
The contract is absent, but the buyer is none the less at the
mercy of the seller. There are two ways in which the buyer
can be protected. Either the law can say that the ownership
by an individual or a corporation of all or substantially all, the
means of production in a particular industry is illegal, or
the State can undertake the work of fixing the maximum
charge for the products of the industry.
In regard to laws rendering illegal the acquirement by one
person, natural or artificial, of all the means of production in
a single industry, it may be pointed out, that this is an attempt
to make law run counter to what seems to be a natural
economic tendency. The success of such legislation may well
be doubted. Even if such success were possible, it might be
sacrificing a great good to prevent one evil. In favor of the
single producer, it can be urged that competition is ever
producing the ruin of some of the competitors; that pro-
duction is cheapened by consolidation; that while competition
may be the life of trade, it often kills the trader, and that a
society whose industries are not subject to great fluctuations,
means a society in which the people are happier. There is
something in this argument. But the thing which chiefly
concerns us here is the legality or practicability of such
legislation from a purely legal point of view. As far as a law
limiting the amount of a certain kind of property which an
individual can acquire is concerned, our courts, would certainly
declare it unconstitutional. The right of a man to pursue
happiness is synonymous with his right to acquire property,
and the right to pursue happiness is written in every State con-
stitution. The Fourteenth Amendment has placed it to some
extent under the protection of the Federal Government. The
.attitude of our Federal judges towards such legislation is
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undoubtedly hostile. Take, for instance, the expression of the-
members of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding
the graded income tax law passed by the Fiftieth Congress..
Justice Field says: "The income tax under consideration is
marked by discriminating features which affect the whole law..
Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens
a law imposes or in the benefit it confers on any citizens by
reason of their birth or wealth or religion, it is class legislation,.
and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses and to general
unrest and disturbance in society."' While Mr. Justice Fuller
says: "Not that it (the law) is not open to abuse by such de-
ductions and exceptions as might make taxation under it so
wanting in uniformity and equality as in substance to amount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law."
2  If
this was the courts attitude toward a graded income tax we-
may know what it would be towards an act limiting the-
amount of property which an individual could acquire in busi-
ness.
In regard to laws limiting the amount of property held by
corporations, the peculiar relations of our State and national
government make the difficulties in the face of such legisla--
tion practically insuperable. The United States cannot limit
the property held by a corporation or, in fact, affect the busi-
ness of producing in any way. Each State could limit the-
corporations in its own State, but it cannot control the action
of other States. A policy limiting the amount of property to
be acquired by a corporation, to have any hope of success,
must be adopted by all the States. But our States have never
yet shown sufficient vitality to construct joint-state legislation.
Any State which attempted to pass such legislation by itself
would find that the result of its legislation would be the
exodus of capital and energy from the State. Lastly, it may
be seriously doubted how far such legislation could affect cor-
porations already formed, and not impair the obligation of
contract with the corporation contrary to the mandate of the:
I Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 596.
2Rehearing, i58 U. S. 6oi, pp. 633-34.
3 United States v. R. C. Knight & Co., 156 U. S. z.
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Federal Constitution. From whatever side, therefore, eco-
nomic or legal, which we regard the question, we are forced
to the conclusion that if the consumer is to be protected, it
must be from the side of price regulation, and not by an
.attempt to force back the wheels of economic change, and
re-create a multitude of producers competing with each other.
Price regulation has this advantage; it gets at the evil pro-
duced by the monopoly directly. As has been stated, the
.evil from the consumer's point of view is not the combination,
neither is it the control of an industry by a single person, but
the resultant position of all buyers who can buy only from one
seller. The recognition of the right of the State to regulate
prices would, in one sense, be a recognition of the old prin-
.ciple of the law that he who enters a trade must be limited in
his right of contract where such limitation is necessary to
secure to the consumers reasonable prices, that is, prices not
greatly in advance of the cost of production. On the other
hand, it would be a recognition of a distinctly-new right on
the part of the buyer, and a corresponding obligation on the
part of the seller; the one to have and the other to sell at a
reasonable price. While many will ask, will not the industrial
changes going on around us make the recognition of the right
and obligation necessary, none will deny the profound change,
which will result in our most fundamental conceptions of
private law.
The Legislature and the courts have taken a long step for-
ward in the recognition of such a right. For many years the
States have regulated the rates of fare charged by railway
companies. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld this legislation,1 though the right to regulate interstate
fare has been denied on the ground that such regulation was
a matter exclusively for the federal government under the
commerce clause of the Constitution.' The courts have
recognized the right of the public to a reasonable charge in
the absence of any legislation on the subject.3 In Munn v.
I Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.
2 Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.
3 Cowden v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 29 Pac. Rep. 873 ; Railroad Com-
pany v. Sutten, L. R. 4 H. L. 238.
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Ellinois, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an
act declaring all grain warehouses public warehouses and
-regulating the charges for the storage of grain. The grounds
-of the decision were stated by Chief Justice Waite. He said
-that there existed a practical monopoly, and that the business
-of grain storage, as a whole, was essential to the proper hand-
ling of the grain of the country. This decision has been twice
affirmed by the court, in Budd v. New York 2 and Brass v.
Stoeser! In both these cases, we have a dissent opinion by
Mr. Justice Brewer, in which Mr. Justice Field and, in the
last case, Justices Jackson and White concurred The
ground of the dissent is set forth by Mr. Justice Brewer
in Budd v. New York. He draws a distinction between a
public use and public interest. A public use is a use which
the State alone has a right to create and maintain. A high-
way is an example of such a use. If an individual does that
work, he is, pro tanto, doing the work of the State. "The
State doing the work fixes the prices for the use. It does not
lose the right to fix the price, because an individual volun-
tarily undertakes to do the work."
This public use is very different from a public interest.
There is scarcely any property in the use of which the public
has no interest. In reply to the suggestion that there is a
monopoly, and that justifies legislative interference, he points
out that there are two kinds of monopolies, one of law and
one of fact. The former exists when exclusive privileges are
granted by the State. "A monopoly of fact any one can
break . . . Government can prescribe compensation ...
only when the property is in fact devoted to a public use."
" It may be noted here that Mr. Justice Field dissented in
Munn v. Illinois. He also dissented in the Granger Cases,
194U. S. x13.
2143 U. S. 517.
3 153 U. S. 39!.
4 The court, therefore, stood five to four. It is curious to note that
'Mr. Justice Brown, who dissented in Budd v. New York, does not dis-
.sent in the later case. Had he done so, the principle in Minnesota v.
Illinois would have been overruled, and the right of the State to re-
*.%ulate prices declared to be limited to occupations in which the right
-of eminent domain, or some other attribute of sovereignty, was neces-
:sary for the prosecution of the business.
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Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., and others follow-
ing Munn v. Illinois, which upheld the right of a State to-
regulate the charge of railroads. In one of these cases, Stone-
v. Wisconsin (p. I8 I), he gives as his reason for his dissent
that it takes the property of the corporation without due-
process of law. "Of what avail," he asks, "is the constitu-
tional provision that no State shall deprive any person of his.
property except by due process of law, if the state can, by-
fixing the compensation which he may receive for its use, take
from him all that is valuable in the property?" He draws no
distinction between a railroad company and another business
not requiring the exercise of the right of eminent domain, or
between a public and a private business. The Court, in the
case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Mn-
nesota,I declared, Mr. Justice Field concurring, that the
regulation in rates must be reasonable, and that the Courts
were the only ultimate determinators of what was a rea-
sonable rate. The objection urged by Mr. Justice Field
against the Granger Cases, that the principle would result in.
the confiscation of railroad property, therefore falls. The-
present objection to Munn v. Illinois, which proceeds on the-
ground of a distinction between the companies doing the work
of the State, was not thought of until some time after that case-
was decided. No case preceding Budd v. New York, makes.
any mention of such a distinction. The distinction, however,.
would be likely to occur to one who read the authorities cited
by Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois. The first English
authority cited is Lord Chief Justice Hale's treatise, "De Por-.
tibus Maris," I Harg. Law Tracts, 6. The author is speaking
of the right to regulate prices. He then says, "If the king or-
subject have a public wharf, into which all persons that come-
to that port must come . . . because they are the wharfs only
licensed by the Queen . . . or because there is no other'
wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a wharf is newly
erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and.
excessive duties . . . but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate." This is the law to-day: Ensminger v. People,-
134 U. S. 418. 2 147 Ill. 384.
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'The other English authority is the case of Allnutt v. Inglis,'
.decided in i8io, and to it may be traced a suggestion of
the idea that, in order to regulate the price, there must
be a monopoly in law. A dock company owned a ware-
house situated on one of its docks. An Act of Parlia-
ment permitted the storage of wines before payment of duties
confining the privilege to the warehouse of this company.
The court decided that the company must be content with a rea-
.sonable compensation. The facts of the case fall well within Mr.
Justice Brewer's definition of a legal monopoly. Lord Ellenbor-
ough, who decided the case, bases his decision on the language
of Lord Hale just quoted. He says that it" includes the good
sense as well as the law on this subject." There is no intima-
that he would not approve the regulation of the rates of charge
where the monopoly was one of fact arising from the circum-
stance that there was only one warehouse in the port. There
is a repetition of Hale's language on this point, without any
comment. But the facts of the case before him made the
following language, copying as it did part of the language of
Hale all that was necessary: ". . . but if for a particular pur-
pose the public have a right to resort to his premises and make
use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that pur-
pose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must, as
an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable
terms." As, heretofore, most of the monopolies of fact are
also monopolies in law, it is natural that the thought should
have been formulated by Mr. Justice Brewer, that only the
prices of products, or services in which there was a legal
monopoly, could be regulated by law.'
That this view is shared by almost, if not quite, a majority
12 East. 569.
2 The American case cited by the court is Mobile v. Fuille, 3 Ala.
(N.S.) 137. (This case cites all the early English Law on the subject).
The Supreme Court of the State upheld the constitutionality of an act
permitting the City of Mobile to regulate the price of bread. The deci-
sion of the court is placed on the public nature of the calling. The
court points out that upon the same principle, "the country court is
required at least once a year to settle the rates of inn keepers." The
courts may have some criteria of what is a public interest, but none is
intimated, and it would almost follow that all prices could be regulated
by law, or at least that a monopoly in fact or law was not the only evi-
.dence that a business was affected with a public interest.
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of the present members of the Supreme Court and by a great
number of constitutional lawyers, must be admitted. Indeed,
it is more than probable that it will soon be the settled doc-
trine of the courts. But if present economic tendencies are to
continue, the real defect in the argument will become apparent.
That defect lies in making a theory of government rather than
social and economic conditions the basis of the rules of law.
When a distinction is drawn between a monopoly of fact and
one of law, it must be remembered that the distinction is a
valid one as affecting the power of the State to regulate prices
only, when conditions make a real difference in the power of
the monopoly and the importance of controlling the price of
its commodities. If a monopoly exists in fact in the produc-
tion and sale of oil, and as a matter of fact it is impossible for
any person natural or corporate to enter the business, the
result is just the same to the consumer as if the production of
oil was one which, according to Mr. Justice Brewer, "the
public could create and maintain." It is not the public nature
of the business, but the fact of the monopoly, and the import-
ance of the business to the community which is the force be-
hind State laws regulating the rates of fare on railroads.
Just now, following Mr. Hadley, I drew a distinction
between the Roman Law and the Common Law, pointing out
that the former allowed free determination of prices as part of
the unrestricted right of private property, while the common
law in its rules on this subject recognized the commercial
end. The position of Mr. Justice Brewer in his argument,
laying stress as it does on the importance of the free control
of property by the owner, would seem an abandonment of the
theory of the Common Law for that of the Roman Law. This
change appears unfortunate, because at the bottom of the
Common Law rules on this subject is the recognition of the
fact that " trade is the life of the State." And, as we have
pointed out trade is to us, as it was not to the Romans, of
first importance. Unconsciously, Mr. Justice Brewer himself
recognizes this. For, while adopting in part arguments
appropriate to the Roman conditions, he really justifies his
conclusion by trying to show that his position does not hurt
THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.
'trade. He says: "A monopoly in fact any one can break," and
indeed he intimates that all monopolies of fact are due to the
superior service which the so-called "monopolist" gives the
public. "It exists," he says: "Where any one by his
money and labor furnishes facilities for business which no
one else has," and he instances the case of a man who
-erects the only good office building in a city. If all monopo-
lies of fact were of this character the distinction between
monopolies of fact and law in connection with the legality of
price regulation, might be a valid, and certainly would be a
harmless distinction. But the economic facts are against the
learned justice. There are already many monopolies of fact
arising from other causes than superiority of service. And, if
the prices of goods, when the production is practically monopo-
lized, cannot be affected by law, then our law is in this condi-
tion: Agree with your competitor to raise prices, and we will
-put you in prison; but combine with your competitor, form a
corporation, and you can charge what prices you want, the
-courts will declare all adverse legislation unconstitutional.
-Such a condition of our law will not long exist, except it be
that the monopoly feature of production is to be confined to a
few industries. If that feature is to be extended, we will be
forced to recognize a new obligation on the part of the pro-
ducer, an obligation to sell his goods at prices which the courts
shall declare reasonable.
Next month I shall try to take up the question whether
new economic conditions are likely to have any affect our
legal conceptions of the relation of employer and employee.
William Draper Lewis.
_Philade phia, January r, r897.
